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Vickrey (1961) studied a simple auction model in which a single object is 
allocated to a number of risk neutral bidders who privately attach values to the good. 
Maskin and Riley (1984) modified Vickrey,s model by considering risk-averse 
bidders. Alternatively, Pitchik (2004) modified Vickrey's model by considering a 
multiple-object auction with budget constrained bidders. 
In this thesis, I integrate the distinctive features of Maskin and Riley (1984) and 
Pitchik (2004). In particular, I will study a multiple-object auction model with budget 
constrained and risk-averse bidders. I investigate equilibrium bidding strategies and 
expected revenue under the first and second price auctions. 
First, I show that the sequence of sale affects the revenue. In particular, the 
revenue is higher when the more valuable good is sold first than when it is sold next 
(Theorem 1). Also, the bidding price of that good is higher under second price rule 
than under the first price (Theorem 2). Thus, Pitchik's observations remain valid even 
if bidders are risk-averse. 
Also, I study the equilibrium strategies in slightly more general contexts, 
allowing the possibility that a bidder can win both goods (Theorem 3 and Remark 1)， 
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In this paper, I study a budget-constrained, private-valuation, sequential auction 
with two incompletely-informed risk-averse bidders. I investigate the equilibrium 
bidding functions and expected revenue with respect to the first and second price 
formation rules. 
Auction design has become a hot issue since 1960s. The most common forms of 
auction are the first price and the second price auctions^ 
The development of economic theories of auctions can be traced back to 
1960s.William \^ckrey (1961) was the pioneer who formally studied auctions as a 
game of incomplete information. He provided a basic auction model with independent 
private values. He derived equilibrium strategies in both the first price and the second 
price auctions and proved the expected revenues in the first and second price auction 
are equivalent. This revenue equivalence theorem has become a central result in 
auction theory, (cf. "S c^krey 1962.) 
While Vickrey's model assumed that bidders are risk neutral. Holt (1980) 
extended it to a one with symmetric risk-averse bidders. Holt showed that the revenue 
equivalence theorem fails when bidders are risk-averse. In particular, he showed that 
‘ T h e auctions operate in a similar way except the final payment of the object being sold. Bidders 
submit bids in sealed envelopes; the person submitting the highest bid wins the object and pays what he 
bids in the first price auction but the second highest bid in the second price auction. 
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expected revenue is higher under the first price auction than under the second price 
auction. 
Che and Gale (1988) modified Vickrey's model in a different direction, they 
maintained the assumption of risk neutrality, but incorporated the idea of budget 
constrained bidders. Again, in their framework, they showed that the revenue 
equivalence theorem fails again. In particular, they showed that first price auction 
generates higher expected revenue than the second price auction. 
Apart from the single-object auction, Rothkopf (1977), and Wiggans and Weber 
(1979) investigated multiple-object auctions in special frameworks. They required 
special assumptions such as common and fixed values for the goods. 
Multiple-object auctions were further investigated by Pitchik and Schotter in a 
more general framework, with budget constrained risk neutral bidders. Pitchik and 
Schotter (1988) studied the equilibrium bidding strategies for both the first and second 
price auctions. They showed that the price of the first good sold and auction revenue 
can be significantly higher but never lower under second price rules than under the 
first price rule. In addition, they showed that the price of a good is higher if it is sold 
early rather than late. They also introduced new tools such as depleting bid and 
critical values，. 
2 Pithcik and Schotter (1988) also provided an experimental study. Properties of the auction and the 
predictive prower of previous studies also have been tested. They showed that the budget constraints 
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Benoit and Krishna (2001) considered a multiple-object auction with 
complete information; the values of the objects and the budgets of the bidders are 
commonly known^. They show that sequences of sale affect the expected revenue. In 
particular, they showed that if the more valuable good is sold first, the revenue is 
higher than selling the less valuable good first. 
In a general model with incomplete information，Pitchik (2004) studied a 
budge-constrained multiple-object auction. Again, she proved that the sequence of 
sales affects the expected revenue. In particular, she showed that the expected revenue 
is higher when the more valuable good is sold first. Also, in that case, the expected 
price of that good is higher under second price rules that under first price rules. 
In this thesis, I will study a budget-constrained sequential auction, under the 
assumption that bidders are risk-averse. This contrasts with the work of Pitchik and 
Schotter (1988)，Benoit and Krishna (2001) and Pitchik (2004), which assumed 
bidders are risk neutral. Our model is based on the one used by Pitchik (2004)，with 
appropriate modifications. 
My main results are stated as follows. 
Theorem 1，it shows that the sequence of sale affects the expected revenue. In 
affect the behavior of the bidders. 
3 Moreover, they studied a simple model that two objects, may be complements or substitutes, are sold 
to three budget constrained bidders 
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particular, the expected revenue is higher if the more valuable good is sold first. Thus， 
the observation noted by Benoit and Krishna (2001) and Pitchik (2004) remains valid 
even if bidders are risk-averse. 
Then I study the equilibrium bidding strategies under the first price and second 
price auctions. 
Firstly, I consider the special case which the two goods are allocated to different 
bidders separately. In theorem 2,1 show that the bidding price of good one is higher 
under the second price rule. Again, this shows that Pitchik's observation remains valid 
even bidders are risk-averse. 
Then I consider the general case in which there is a possibility of wining both 
goods by one single bidder. In theorem 3，I show that, under the second price auction, 
the equilibrium bidding fimction of the first good is identical to that of the special case 
where the goods are allocated to different bidders separately. 
In Remark 1，I show that it is not necessary to hold this "identical solution" for 
the first price auction. 
Theorem 1 through 3 above considers the situation where the winning bid of 
the first stage is announced. Theorem 4 shows that even it is concealed, the 
equilibrium bidding function under second price rule will not change. 
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Chapter 2 
Reviews of Existing Models 
I will first review a standard auction model introduced by Vickrey (1961). A 
single object is allocated to N potential buyers. Each bidder attaches a private 
valuation, X^  / = 1，2，3 …iV，which is independently identical distributed according 
to the distribution function F over the interval [0, coi]. The probability density 
function of F is denoted by / . I n this model, bidders are assumed to be risk 
neutral and there is no any liquidity. In general, the payoff of bidder i is stated as 
follows. 
n , -X^-Pf if bidder / wins the auction, (2.1) 
where /J is the price of the good which depends on the price formation rules. 
And 
n , =0 if bidder / loses the auction. (2.2) 
I consider two common price rules: the second price auction and the first price 
auction. 
2.1 Second Price Sealed-bid Auction 
Under the second price rules, the object is allocated to the bidder who submits 
the highest bid and the pays the second highest bid. So equation (2.1) becomes 
n , = Xi - max)对.bi i f � > bj. (2.3) 
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It is well-known that submitting the true value of the good, under the second price 
rule, is a weakly dominant strategy to any other strategies. 
2.2 First Price Sealed-bid Auction 
For the first price auction, the winner of the auction has to pay what he bids. 
Suppose for bidder /，he submits a bid b^ ，the payoff fimction is 
n , = Xf 一办, if 办,> max)类,bj. (2.4) 
and the payoff is zero if bidder i cannot obtain the object. 
The following is a central result in auction theory, which states that the first and 
the second price auctions give the same expected revenue. 
2.3 Revenue Equivalence Principle 
Fact 1 (Vickrey 1961, 1962) Suppose that values of the object is independently 
identical distributed and all bidders are risk neutral Then, for any symmetric and 
increasing equilibrium of any standard auction^, such that the expected payment of a 
bidder with value zero is zero, yields the same expected revenue to the seller. 
The expected revenue of the seller is just the sum of the ex ante expected 
payments of the bidders. Thus the expected revenue under the first price and second 
price auctions are the same，. 
4 Such as the first price auction and the second price auction. 
5 Intuitively, with positive probability, the revenue in a first-price auction can exceed the revenue in a 
second-price auction, and vice versa. However the expected revenue depends on the realized values, 
Vickrey argued that on average the revenue to the seller will be the same. 
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2.4 Risk-Averse Bidders 
One important assumption in Fact 1 is the risk neutrality of the bidders. Holt 
(1980) relaxed the assumption and showed that the revenue equivalence principle no 
longer holds. The idea of risk aversion is captured by assuming that each bidder has a 
von-Neumann-Morgenstem utility function w. , the expected payoff of the bidder is 
changed. In the first price auction, the bidder's problem is to choose z e [0, cu] and 
the bid /(z) to maximize his expected utility. The expected utility is obtained by 
modifying (2.4) into: 
G(zMx-r(z)) (2.6) 
where G(z) = (z) is the probability of wining when the bidder chooses z. 
The following fact shows the revenue equivalence result fails: 
Fact 2 (Holt 1980) Suppose that bidders are risk-averse with same utility function. 
Then the expected revenue in the first-price auction is greater than that in the second 
price auction. 
Intuitively, bidders bid more aggressively in the first-price auction because they 
"buy insurance" against the possibility of losing. 
2,5 Budget Constraints 
After studying the case of risk aversion, let us study another alternative model, in 
which the assumption of risk neutrality is retained. Now, the bidders are facing no 
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cash, or credit market imperfection. The budget constraint is modeled by 
incorporating a budget variable . Instead of only a valuation is assigned, a 
value-budget pair [X ,^W ]^ is independently and identically distributed on 
[0,1] X [0,1] among each bidder. Bidder's strategy is defined as : [0,1] x [0,1]-> 沢， 
i.e. his bid depends on his value and budget. 
Again, the following fact shows that the revenue equivalence result fails. 
Fact 3 (Che and Gale 1998) Suppose that bidders are subjected to financial 
constraints. In equilibrium, the expected revenue in the first-price auction is greater 
than the expected revenue in the second-price auction. 
Intuitively, Fact 3 holds because budget constraints are softer in the first-price 
auction than in the second price auction. A example quoted from Krishna p. 147: 
consider a hypothetical situation in which each bidder's value is Z, = } 
and there are no budget constraints. I let the revenue of the hypothetical situation be 
R. The revenue from the second price auction is the same as the hypothetical 
situation. The revenue in a first price auction is greater than R because the 
comparison is between a situation in which bidders have values 不 > Z, and budgets 
W] > Z, and the hypothetical situation. 
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2.6 Budget-Constrained Sequential Auction with risk neutral 
bidders.^ 
Pitchik (2004) considered a two-goods auction with budget constrained bidders. 
There are two risk neutral bidders who are competing for two heterogeneous goods. 
The values attached to the goods, and the budget constraints are independently 
identical distributed according to an arbitrary distribution function. Pitchik obtained 
the following results 
Fact 4 (Pitchik 2004) The expected revenue is independent of the price formation 
rules and depends only on the sequence in which the goods are sold. Also, the revenue 
is maximized if the more valuable good is soldfirst. 
Intuitively, if the more valuable good is sold first, the first good is allocated to 
the one with higher income. If the less valuable good is sold first, the bidder with 
higher income will intentionally lose the first good and obtain the second good at a 
price of the opponent's remaining income. This helps to make the revenue higher 
when the more valuable good is sold first. 
Fact 5 (Pitchik 2004) The expected price of good one is higher under second price 
rule than under first price rule. 
Intuitively, under the first price rules, the bidder is worried about obtaining the 
6 The framework and results stated here are drawn from Pitchik.(2004). 
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good 1 at a relatively high price and so he makes a conservative bid. On the other 
hand, under second price rules, a bidder does not have to pay what he bid for the first 
good under the second price rule, so he has a incentive to submit a higher bid to 
deplete the opponent's budget. Thus, he can obtain the second at a lower price. 
I will reexamine Fact 4 and 5 later, with my introduction of risk aversion. 
After reviewing these existing models, in the next chapter, I will present my 




3.1 Model's Background 
Following Pitchik (2004)，I assume that there are two bidders competing for two 
heterogeneous goods, a and "， which are allocated to them by a sequential 
auction. Valuations attached to the goods by each bidder are determined by an 
arbitrary function, v,(.) y = a,j8, and a type variable t . I assumed that the value 
function is increasing with the type. Moreover, I assume good a is more valuable 
than good "，i.e. > Vp{t) for all t. The formulations of the value functions 
are commonly known to each bidder. Thie private information environment is modeled 
by a type variable t which is privately known and independently identically 
distributed on interval [0,1] according to a distribution function H , and the 
corresponding density function is denoted by h. The budget lit) of each bidder is 
assigned by the same distribution function. The function I{t) is also commonly 
known to each bidder. While Pitchik (2004) assumed both bidders are risk neutral, 
alternatively, I assume both bidders are risk-averse. Each bidder has a 
von-Neumann-Morgenstem utility function u that satisfies m(0) = 0 , u'> 0 and 
u"< 0. This formulates the feature that each bidder is risk-averse. 
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The payoff of bidder of type t is: ^ 
n , =u(v^{t)-PJ if bidder t wins or at 
n , =u{yp(t)-Pp) if bidder t wins p at P^, 
ri, = (0 + (0-Pcz~Pp) if bidder t wins and at price 
Pa 肪d Pp. 
n , =w(0) = 0 if bidder t wins nothing. 
Following Pitchik (2004), I make an the following basic assumption: 
Assumption A1 The budget of each bidder must lie between values of one of two 
goods and the sum of the values of two goods for any individual t. Formally, it can 
be written as 
v^(/)</(0<v„(0 + v^(0 Y = cc,p and r e [0,1] 
If the left inequality is violated, the budget constraint is too tight. Bidders may 
not have enough income to submit an effective bid on any one of the goods. On the 
contrary, if the right inequality is violated, the bidder acquires an income which is 
greater than the sum of the values of two goods, then the bidder's bidding decision is 
no longer restricted by the budget constraint, because no one bids more than the 
values of the object. I call this assumption as effective budget constraint assumption. 
7 The form v^ (j) + Vp ( / ) means the two goods are neither complements nor substitutes. The 
auction of complements or substitutes has been studied by Benoit and Krishna (2001). They tackle the 
problem by considering a synergies variable which affects the valuations if the two goods are 
complements or substitutes. 
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3.2 Auction's Rules 
An individual t is restricted not to spend more than his budget I{t) and 
constrained not to submit a bid which is above his budget. 
The sequential auction operates as follows. In the fist stage, one of the goods is 
brought up for sale to those two potential buyers. The one who submits higher bid 
obtains the good and the payment is determined by the price formation rules. In the 
first price auction, the payment is exactly the bid of the winner. In the second price 
auction, the payment is the second highest bid, i.e. the opponent's bid. The winning 
bid is then announced by the seller. 
After the first stage auction, the de facto valuation for the second good of a type 
t bidder is the minimum of the bidder's valuation of the second good and his 
remaining income. In the second stage, the bidder with higher de facto valuation 
obtains the good at the lower de facto valuation, so that the second good is sold at a 
price of lower de facto valuation. 
Following Pitchik (2004), the equilibrium concept I use solution concept of 
perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Replacing the second stage of game by the equilibrium 
payoff I obtain a one-stage Bayesian game G that depends on the distributions of 
resources and valuations of bidders. The strategy set of a bidder of type / in the 
game G is [0，/(/)]，the set of feasible bids on good. The rules of the game are the 
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auction rules that determine the winner of the first good given bids. I study a 
symmetric equilibrium of G，that is, I seek a function b: [0,1]—识 that assigns for 
each a type, and with the property that (b^b) is a Nash equilibrium of G • 
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3.3 Revenue and Sequence of Sale 
Under the setting of heterogeneous multiple objects auction, it is known that 
the revenue will be substantially affected by the bidding behavior and the sequence of 
sale. (cf. Benoit and Krishna (2001), Pitchik (2004)). To illustrate this, I quote an 
example from Pitchik (2004). 
Consider a two goods auction under second price rules, for simplicity assumes 
the information is complete. There are two budget constrained bidders. Also, assume 
the incomes of two bidders are 130 and 60 respectively. The bidders have identical 
values on the two goods. The values are 200 and 60 respectively. 
Once the first good is allocated, the winner's income is reduced by the price of 
good one. Then the equilibrium bid of the second is the minimum of the bidder's 
valuation and his depleted income. Since the bidder with income 60 can at most pay 
60 for each good and the bidder with income 130 has at least 70 to bid on the second 
good no matter who is the winner of the first good. The order of sale will affect the 
maximum amount that bidder 130 is willing to pay. 
If the sequence of sale is 200，60，bidder 130 acquires payoff equals 200-p in 
which p is the price of good 200. Alternatively, if bidder 130 shades his bid and 
allows bidder 60 to win the good 200 at the price less than 60, then bidder 200 will 
obtain the good 60 at price 60-p which is the remaining income of bidder 60. In this 
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case, bidder 130's payoff is p. When p<60, 200-p > p, thus bidder 130 is willing to 
pay more than 60 to obtain good 200. Therefore, in equilibrium, both goods are 
allocated to bidder 200 at price equals to 60. 
Now I turn to the case that the order of sale is 60,200. If bidder 130 obtains the 
good 60 at any price p<60 and obtains the good 200 at a price of 60，then his payoff 
is 200-p. However, this is not the equilibrium strategy for bidder 130. Bidder 130 can 
intentionally lose the good 60 at a relatively high price in order to deplete the bidder 
60，s income. Thus, in equilibrium, bidder 60 obtains the good 60 at a price of 59， 
bidder 130 obtains the good 200 at prices of 1 and the revenue is greatly reduced to 60 
(instead of 120) in the order of sale is 200,60. 
In a single object auction, the equilibrium bidding function increases with the 
valuation of the good. However, in a budget constraint sequential auction, the above 
fact no longer holds. As the example showed above, this may be beneficial to lose 
good 1 at a high price and obtain good 2 at a low price. 
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3.4 Critical Value 
In the risk-neutral situation, the equilibrium bidding behavior of the budget 
sequential auction can be found by the using concept of critical value. The critical 
value is defined as the bidder is indifference between wining the first good and 
obtaining the second good if he bids at a price of critical value. Defining cit) as the 
critical value for good one of a bidder of type t who faces another bidder of type t. By 
the definition of critical value, the following equation is set up. 
«[v, (0 - m = u { v , (0 - [1(0 - c(t)]}. (3.1) 
The term in the left hand side is the utility gain if a bidder of type t obtaining the 
first good at the price of c{t). The term in the right hand side is the utility acquired 
when a bidder of type t facing an identical bidder and wins the second stage auction 
at opponent's remaining income. 
As the utility function is assumed to be strictly increasing, (3.1) implies : 
Vi(/)-c(0 = V2 ( , ) - ( / ( , ) - _ . (3.2) 
Equation (3.2) is identical to Pitchik's equation for risk neutral bidders. 
By (3.2)，we have: 
拳 • / ( / ) - V 2 ( , ) (3 3) 
If the bidder of type t bids c{t) in the first stage, then condition on the opponent is 
also the same type t，the utility gain is 
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= “(V 丨(0 + V2(0-/(0) (3 4) 
3.5 Revenues of the Sequential Auction 
Following the approach of Picthik (2004), I make the following two assumptions 
on bidder's budget: 
Assumption A2 The income of every bidder must be greater than the highest critical 
value. Formally, 
c(l) < 1(0 We[0，l]. 
This implies a fact that a bidder of type t must have enough income to cover 
the payment in the first stage auction.. (No bidder is willing to pay more that the 
highest critical value.) 
Assumption A3 The income of the winner of the first good must be less than the 
lowest critical values plus the value of good two of a type t bidder. Formally, 
m<c(0) + v,(t) V/G[0,1], 
where c(0) is the de facto valuation for the good one of a bidder of type 0 who 
faces another bidder of type 0. This is the lowest bid submitted by the bidders. 
� . . . . 
Assumption A3 says that the remaining income of the winner of the first good must be 
less than or equal to his own valuation of good two. This assumption simplifies the 
calculation of optimal bidding strategies by restricting the bid submitted by the winner 
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of the first good to be v � ( . ) . � 
3.5 Results 
Expected Revenue 
Under the risk-averse case, I successfully carry over the observation established 
by Pithcik (2004) (see Fact 4 in section 3.3) into our context. 
Theorem 1 Under the setting of risk aversion, for any sequential auction satisfying 
assumptions A J-A3, the expected revenue is independent of the price formation rules 
and only depends on the sequence of the goods being sold. Moreover, if the more 
valuable good is allocated to the bidder of higher type, and if lit) is increasing with 
t then the expected revenue is maximized if the more valuable good is soldfirst. 
Proof. I will follow the proof of Pitchik (2004). Suppose the more valuable good 
is sold first, as I consider the equilibrium bidding function increases in t, this implies 
that the stronger bidder would submit a higher bid for the more valuable good. Then, 
by assumption A3，the second good is sold at a price of the remaining income of the 
winner of the first good. The expected revenue is the expected value of /(>v,) where 
Wj is the higher one among t and s. 
On the contrary, if the less valuable good is sold first. By the hypothesis that the 
more valuable good is allocated to the bidder of higher type, then the higher type 
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bidder submits a bid lower than the lower type bidder for the first good, this implies 
the less valuable good is allocated to the bidder of lower type. Also, by assumption A3, 
the second good is sold at a price of the remaining income of the winner of the first 
good. Therefore the expected revenue is the expected value of liyvj) where Wj is 
the lower one among t and s. 
Since I(t) is increasing with t, we have E[I{w^) > ^[/(Wj)]. Thus the 




Pitchik used a slightly different assumption. She assumed that the bidders are 
risk neutral and the critical value c{t) is increasing with t. In addition, she assumed 
that the bidding function of the first good b{t) is increasing with the critical value. 
She proved that valuations affect the bidding function through the critical value only. 
Alternatively, I assumed that the bidders are risk-averse. After deriving the first 
derivative of the bidding function of the first good, I find that the utility function 
makes me fails to prove that valuations affect the bidding function through the critical 
value only. 
20 
Comparing the Bidding Price of Two Goods 
Pitchik (2004) studied different price formation rules. Similarly, I study first 
price and second price auctions. I will derive expected payoffs of these rules. I will 
also compare the bidding prices of the first good between the case of risk neutrality 
and risk aversion. In what follows, I assume: 
Assumption A4 The more valuable good a is sold first and the equilibrium 
bidding function of the first good is increasing with t. 
From here on, good one is a，good two is p . 
For simplicity, I make the following two assumptions: 
Assumption A5 Income is fixed across two bidders and equal to 1. 
lit) = 1 We[0，l]. 
By restricting the incomes of both bidders to be 1，the calculation of obtaining the 
F.O.C of the expected payoff fimction is substantially simplified. 
The next assumption assumes that the two heterogeneous goods are allocated to 
different bidders separately. This assumption rules out the possibility of obtaining 
both goods by one particular bidder. (I will relax this assumption in the next chapter.) 
Assumption A6 For any two agents, t and s. If t>s, then the first good is 
allocated to agent t, and the second good is allocated to agent s at the price of 
the remaining income of individual t. 
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First, I study the second price auction. I denote by (.) bidding function under 
second price auction rule. Thus, bjj (t) is the bid of the agent of type t. Also, 
n"(/，jc) denotes the expected payoff of agent t who claims to be type x. I 
consider the case that the opponent, agent s is bidding his true type, but agent t 
Q 
tries to conceal his true type. 
U"{t,x)=lu[v,{t)-b,{sms)ds+ lu[v,it)-(l-b,j(x))]h{s)ds. (3.5) 
The first term equation (3.5) is the expected utility gain from wining the first good 
and the second term is the utility gain from obtaining the second good. 
I will derive the bidding function of good one under second price auction by 
using the first order differentiation condition. Individual t is trying to choose an 
optimal X for maximizing the expected payoff. Differentiating the expected payoff 
function with respect to x, equation (3.5) becomes 
犯 � = u [ v , ( / ) - b, (x)]h{x) - u[v, ( 0 - (1 - b, (x))] hix) 
(3.6) 
Incentive compatibility requires that,浙(,，太)二�at x = t. Thus, equation (3.6) 
dx 
becomes 
u[v, ( 0 - bii (x)]/2(o - u[v, ( 0 - (1 一 b„ m K t ) 
(i (3.7) 
+ ( 0 - 0 - ^ / ( 0 ) ] ^ ' / / (t)h(s)ds = 0. 
8 Recall that a is good one, and /? is good two, so Vj = v^jVj = v^ . 
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After integrating and rearranging terms, we obtain: 
々，(八 _ “[V2 ( 0 - ( 1 - b i i (0)] - u[v, ( t ) - b , (t)] h{t) 
u'[v,{t)-{\-b,m l-H(t). (18) 
Similarly, I study the bidding function bj (.) for first price case. The expected 
payoff of type t who claims to be type x is: 
n 力，x)= f 必 + (3.9) 
•u •ic 
For the first term, instead of paying what the agent s bids, individual t pays his 
own bid^. If individual t loses in the auction in stage 1，then he obtains the second 
good at a price of remaining income of agent s By incentive compatibility, we 
have: 
"[V, ( 0 一 bi ( _ ( o - ( 0 - ( H , m m 
(, . (3.10) 
- 一 （ 1 一 b , m b \ (tMs)ds = 0 •u 
Thus, 
‘ " 丨 [ V i W - 棚 ( ) 
Using equation (3.8) and (3.11), I obtain the following theorem, which states that 
the bidding price of the first good is higher under the second-price auction than 
first-price auction. Again, this result shows that Pitchik's observation (see Fact 5 in 
Section 2.6 above) holds even if bidders are risk-averse. 
9 The term b „ ( s � i n (3.5) is replaced by bj ( x ) . 
1 � T h e term 1 一办"(x) in (3.5) is replaced by 1 - b j (5) 
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Lemma 1 h^ (/) > c{t) > b! (t). 
Proof. By assumption A4, the bidding function of the first good b{t) is 
increasing in t. From equation (3.8)，the sign of the derivative b\j (t) is solely 
determined by the term (/)-(1 - b ^ ( 0 ) ] - { t ) - b ^ ^ ( 0 ] . Since b\{t)>0, it 
follows that: 
"[V2 (0 - (1 - h _ - (0 - b, (/)] ^  0. 
Since w(.) is an increasing function, we have: 
[v, (,) - (1-从))]- [vi (0 "A w] 2 0， 
Hence 
buit)>c{t). (3.12) 
Similarly, (/) 2 0，then by (3.11)，I have: 








Thus, Lemma 1 immediately shows that the bidding price of the first good is 
higher under the second price rule than under the first price rule. Formally, I state it as 
a theorem. 
Theorem 2 If bidders are risk-averse, then for any two goods sequential auction 
satisfying assumptions A1-A6, the bidding price of the first good is higher under the 
second price rule than under the first price rule. 
Since the typical form of a risk-averse utility function is intricate. Though I have 
tried to explicitly solve out the bidding function of the first good by simplifying the 
value functions and distribution function, I still fail to pin down the bidding fimction 
explicitly. 
The intuition has been stated in Pitchik (2004). Under the first price rule, 
obtaining the first good at a relatively high price means the bidder may lose the 
second good. Therefore, bidders make a conservative bid under first price rule. On the 
contrary, under second-price auction, the bidder is worried about failing to obtain the 
first good at a relative low price. This intuition can still apply to case of risk aversion. 
Equation (3.8) and (3.11) give the derivative of the bidding function of the first 
good under different price rules. To characterize the solutions of bj (.) and bjj (•) ； I 
need two initial conditions. It is given by the following the Lemma, which states the 
bidding price of the first good submitted by a type 0 bidder under the first price first 
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rule is c(0) and the bidding price of the first good submitted by a type 1 bidder 
under the second price rule is c(l). 
Lemma 2 
a) ^(0) = c(0). 
b) = 肌 
Proof. First, I will prove lemma 2a by contradiction. By theorem 2, I have 
c(t) > bj (/) for all / e (0,1). Now, I suppose c(0) > bj (0) and choose a small real 
number s > 0 such that （0) + f < c(0) .1 let the type of bidder who 
corresponding submits a bid of b, (0) + s be . Suppose a bidder of type 0 replaces 
his bid bj (0) by bj (0) + ，then there exists a positive probability that he is facing a 
type less than t* • Before replacing the bid b! (0) by bj (0) + e, the type 0 bidder has 
zero probability of winning the first good unless facing a type 0 bidder. After 
replacing the bid, the type 0 bidder has a positive probability of winning the first good 
at the price of b, (0) + £： < c(0). 
If the bidder of type 0 is facing another bidder of type 0，he will submit a bid of 
c(0). Now, when he is facing a bidder of type /，if he submits a bid of b八0) + s， 
then he has a positive probability of winning the first good even at the price lower 
than c(0). Therefore, he is strictly better off with the Pr[r </*]. He will deviate 
from submitting a bid of 办,(0). A contradiction is derived. Thus, I have b! (0) > c(0). 
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Then by Lemma 1，I have bj (0) = c(0). This proves lemma 2a. 
Similarly, I will prove lemma 2b. By theorem 2,1 have bjj (t) > c(t) for all 
t e (0,1). Now, I suppose b^ (1) > c(l) and choose a small real number ^ >0 such 
that bj (!)-£•> c(l) .1 let the type of bidder who corresponding submits a bid of 
bii (1) - s be t*\ Suppose a bidder of type 1 replaces his bid b^(1) by Z>"(l)-f， 
then there exists a positive probability that he is facing a type higher than . Before 
replacing the bid b" (1) by b^ (1) 一 f，the type 1 bidder must obtain the first good 
unless facing a type 1 bidder. After replacing the bid, the type 1 bidder has a positive 
probability of losing the first good. 
If the type 1 bidder is facing another type 1 bidder, by definition, he will submit a 
bid of c(l). Now, when he is facing a bidder of type t, if he submits a bid of 
bu (1) - , then he will have a possibility of losing the first good at the price higher 
than c(l). Therefore, the bidder of type 1 is strictly better off with the Pr[/ >/••]• He 
will deviate from submitting a bid of (1). A contradiction is derived. Thus, I have 
bii (1) < c(l). Then by Lemma 1，I have b^ (1) = c(l). This proves lemma 2b. 
Q.E.D. 
The Single object auction (cf. Vickrey (1961,1962) andd Che and Gale, (1998)) 
usually assumes b(.) = 0 ’ and the valuations of the goods attached by a bidder of 
type 0 are 0. Alternatively, I assume the valuations of the goods attached by a bidder 
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of type 0 are not zero, i.e. v, (0)本 0 and v? (0) 0. Also, if the type 0 bidder loses the 
first good, then he can win the second good. Thus, the bid submitted by a type 0 for 




More General Cases 
4.1 A possibility of winning both goods by one of the bidders 
In previous arguments, I restrict to the special case where no bidders can win 
both goods. (See Assumption 6). The two goods are allocated to different bidders. In 
this section, I relax the assumption A6 and investigate a more general case where 
there is a possibility of winning both good by one of the bidders. The expected payoff 
under different price rules will be investigated separately. Without loss of generality, 
assume good 1 is sold first, good 2 is sold next. 
Considering the second price auction first, before explicitly stating the expected 
payoff of a particular bidder of type t , I consider the set of the opponents who lose 
good 2 to the bidder of type t who pretends to be type x，and it can be divided into 
two sets", 
erf (t, x) = (0，A：) n {5: V2 (s) < min{v2 (0,1 一 � } } and 
o f (/，x) = ix,l) n [s: V2 (0 > min{v2 Cs)，l - b�! (x)}}. 
If the opponent's type s g cr" (J, X), then the individual of type t not only obtains 
good 1 at the price of b" (s)，but also obtains the second good at the price of Vj (s). 
On the other hand, if the opponent's type s g ct" {t,x)，the individual of type t lose 
11 The method is due to Pitchik (2004). 
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the good 1 but obtains the second good at the price of min{v2 ( 0 , 1 - 办 " ( 太 ) } . 
For the first price auction, the sets of opponent are defined similarly: 
cr/ (/，x) = (0, x) [s: Vj (s) < min{v2 (0,1 - bj (x)}} and 
it. x) = (x，l) n{s:v2 (0 > mm{v2 (力，1 - bj (•?)}}. 
Similar to the case of the second price auction, if the types of the opponent 
belong to al{t ,x), then the type t bidder obtains both goods; if the type of the 
opponent belongs to (r,jc)，then the type t bidder obtains the good 2 only but at 
the price of minfv: (,)，1 - h^ (5)}. 
Now I give expected payoff of the bidder of type t who pretends to be typex 
under the second price auction: 
n " (/，:c) = JVvi ( , ) - A W M y ^ y 
+ 丄 " " 、 ( 0 + V2 ( 0 - h � - V 2 (s)] — W[v, ( 0 - bjj (s)}his)ds 
+ L «[V2(0 -minK(5), l (x)}]h(s)ds (4.1) 
•0'2 ('’太） 
Similarly, the expected payoff under the first price rule is: 
•0 
+ Lr , {"[^l (0 + V^ (0 - b, (X) -il-b, (X))] - U[V, (0 - b, (X)]}h(s)ds 
+ J w[v2 (0 - min {v2 ⑷，1 - b!�}]树•s)必 (4.2) 
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I require the following lemma to prove a theorem. 
Lemma 3 � 二„(,�{u[v, (t) + v, (/) - b!! {s) 一 v^  (s)] 一 u[v, (/) - bjj � = 0 
at x = t. 
Lemma 3(b) � " ( � { u [ v , (t) + v,(t) 一b!! {s) 一 v^(5)] - u[v,(t) 一bj, (s)}Ks)ds] 二 0 
at t = x. 
Proof. To prove Lemma 3(a), I define a set 
^ = {-y ： V2 (s) < inin{v2 (/)，1 - b!! 0)}}, 
so A is independent of x，and 
af{t,x) = iO,x)nA. 
Define 
g(s, t) = {u[v, (0 + V2 (0 - bu (s) - V2 (s)] - u[v, (0 - (称⑷. 
Then: 
• {w[v, (/) + V2 (0 - bj, (s) - V, (5)] - m[v, (r) - b^ = 
i(0,;c)n>4 "U 
where is the characteristic function of set A, i.e., 
1^(5) = 1 if j e j 
1^(5) = 0 if s^ A 
Note that for any non-zero J > 0, we have: 
fK+S pc+s pc+s 一 “ \gis,t)\ds < [ . 
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Therefore: 
11111 < lim^ < lim-^  . 
Since g{s,t) is continuous, it follows that: 
At jc = / , we have g{t,t) = 0. Therefore, as 
— =lim— ，we have: 
dx “0 S 
(l+S (K (l+S 
0 = -git,t) = lim-^——< ——^ = g{t,t) = 0. 
0 s Ox ^->0 5 
x^t 
Thus — = 0 • This proves Lemma 3a. 
dx 
x=t 
Lemma 3b can be proved similarly, and I omit it. 
Q.E.D. 
The following result shows that even with the possibility of allowing bidder to 
win both goods, (i.e. without A6), the bidding fimction of the first good under the 
second price rule will be the same as that for the special case without the possibility, 
(i.e. A6 holds.) 
Theorem 3 Suppose bidders are risk avers. Then the bidding function of the first good 
under second price rule with assumptions A J-AS is identical to that with assumptions 
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AI-A6. 
Proof. Incentive compatibility requires that in equilibrium, the expected payoff is 
maximized when x=t. Thus, the partial derivative of with respect to x is 
zero at x = t. Consider the problem of second price auction first. Differentiate 
n “ (J, x) with respect to jc , and put x = t ’ equation (4.1) becomes: 
u[v, (/) - b, (t)]h{t) - u[v, ( 0 一 (1 一 b, m m 
+ "'[V2 (0 - (1 - h iOWn iOKs)ds = 0. (4.3) 
(j" {t,t) = (/,1) which means that upon pretending, the bidder of type t will not 
get nothing in equilibrium. Simplifying equation (4.3) and taking the integration, (4.3) 
becomes: 
u[v, (t) 一 b, {tmt) 一 u[v, (0 - (1 -b, , (t))W) + (/) 一 (1 -b „ (tWn ( 0 • [1 - 丑 ( 0 ] = 0 .(4.4) 
After rearranging the terms of equation (4.4)，I obtain: 
� _ (0 - (1 - b!! (0)] - U[V, (0 - b, it)] h(t) 
Equation (4.5) is same as equation (3.8), hence, I obtain the equation 
bjj (,) > cit) without the assumption A6. By lemma 2b, the bidder of type 0 also 
submits a bid of c(l). Since the initial condition and the growth path are the same 
under two cases, so we can conclude that the bidding function of the first good under 




In this more general case, the bidder of type t may obtain both goods by 
pretending his type to be x. Under the second price rule, the winner of the first 
good is required to pay the opponent's bid instead of his own bid. Thus, changing the 
value of X would not affect the remaining income after the first stage auction as 
well as the probability of winning the second good. Also, the benefit from obtaining 
the second good is not affected by the value of jc because the payment of the 
second good is the opponent's bid in this second price rule. Therefore, the expected 
marginal benefit of pretending in the first stage is not influenced when the bidder 
pretends to be a higher type; the bidding behavior is identical under these two cases. 
Now, I investigate the similar problem for the first price auction. Moreover, I do 
not get the "identical solution" result. 
Remark 1 Suppose bidders are risk-averse. The first derivative of the bidding 
Junction of the first good in the first price auction with A1-A5, and with AI-A6 could 
be different.. 
To show this, equation (4.2) states the expected utility of a type t bidder who 
claims to be type x under first price rule. Similarly, cr^ (t,x) = (jc,1) and 
min{v2 一 bi (<?)} = 1 一 (•?) • Simplifying terms, equation (4.2) becomes: 
n^ (t,x)= [u[v,(t)-b,{xms)ds 
« I 
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+ la ,{"[^ 1 (0 + (0 -1]-u[v,(0 - b , (x)]}h{s)ds 
+ w[V2(0-1 + bj{s)]h{s)ds. (4.6) 
fK 
Taking differentiating over (4.6), I obtain: 
^ ^ I t i = u[v, (0 - b, {x)]h(x) - r ( 0 - b, ix)h(s)ds 
OX 
+ 石 I ( ⑶ ⑴ + (0 - 1] - «[Vi (0 一 bi {X)\}h{s)ds 
-u[v^{t)-\ + b,{xmx). (4.7) 
By putting x = t,犯（，尤)=0，equation (4.7) becomes: 
dx 
(0 -b j (OMO - (0 - b! {t)Wj {t)h{s)ds « ) 
+ I： �{"[�� + ( 0 - 1] 一 «[V, ( 0 — ^ ix)]}his)cis\ 
OX 办I ('’""^) 
-u[v,(t)-l + b,(tmt) = 0. (4.8) 
Simplifying and rearranging terms of (4.8), I obtain: 
"[V, (0 - b,(聊)-w,[Vi (0 - b! (OF, (t)H(t) 
+ i 1/ { “ [ � � + (0 一 1] 一 (0 - b, WlK^y^l 
+ = (4,9) 
According to equation (4.9)，the first derivative of the bidding function is derived: 
b, (/) = ^ ^ 
"丨[V丨 
• (4.10) 
By comparing equation (4.10) and (3.11), the two equations are identical except 
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the presence of the last term in the numerator of equation (4.10). If the value of the 
differentiating term is positive, then the derivative of the bidding function is higher 
under the case of without A6. 
However, the value of the term is determined by two opposing forces, it is 
ambiguous. Let x increases. By the second part of the set 
(j[ (,，x) = (0，x) n {j: V2 (j) < min{v2 (0,1 一 b! (jc)}} ’ it is noted that the rage of the set 
becomes smaller, then the definite integral in equation (4.10) is integrating over a 
smaller set. Thus, the value of the differentiating term is negative. On the other hand, 
as X is increases, the value of the terms inside the definite integral becomes larger. 
Thus, the value of the last term in the numerator is positive. 
At intuitive level, the last term in the numerator is the marginal benefit of 
pretending in the first stage bidding process. If the bidder of type t pretends to be a 
higher type, two opposing torques will be triggered. The first one is that as x is 
increased, then the bidder is required to pay a higher price for the first good, and the 
remaining income is reduced. As a result, the probability of the bidder of type t 
winning the second good is also reduced. On the contrary, after the payment of the 
first good, if the bidder of type t still wins the second good, which means the 
bidder wins the second good at a lower price and acquires a higher marginal benefit. 
Therefore, these two opposing forces contribute the ambiguous result. 
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4.2 The winning bid of the first stage auction is concealed 
After investigating the problem that there is a possibility of wining both auctions 
by one particular bidder, now, I focus on the problem that the winning bid of the first 
stage auction is concealed to the loser. In the previous settings, the winning bid of the 
first stage auction is revealed to both bidders. The loser of the first stage auction 
utilizes this piece of information and reveals the true type of the winner. Then, the 
remaining income and the value of good 2 attached by the winner are known by the 
loser of the first good. 
However, if the winning bid of the first good is concealed, the second stage 
auction will become a sealed-bid auction. Now I am going to prove that the derivative 
of the bidding fimction of the first good under second price rule is identical to the case 
of allocating both goods to different bidder separately. 
Theorem 4 Suppose bidders are risk averse, and the sequential auction satisfies 
assumptions A1-A5, the winning bid of the first good is concealed, the function bjj (.) 
under the assumption that is same as the function bjj (.) under the assumption that 
the winning bid is announced. 
Proof. I consider the case where the winning bid is concealed. I need go give the 
expected payoff. 
Under the second price rule, if a bidder of type t obtains the first good at a 
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price of bii (5)，the remaining income of the bidder is 1 - b^j {s) because the 
payment of the winner is the opponent's bid. Considering the second stage auction, 
the winner of the first good will submit a bid of l -bj j (j) for the second good. The 
loser of the first good, the bidder of type s，will submit the bid due to the 
truth telling property under the second price rule. On the contrary, if the first good is 
obtained by the opponent, then the bidder t will submit a bid of V2(/) for the 
second good. 
According to the second price rule, the price of the second can be divided into 
several cases. Suppose a bidder of type t obtains the first good and the opponent's 
type belongs to cr" {t,x), then the price of the second good is Vj (s). Alternatively, if 
the opponent's type belongs to a" (t,x), then the bidder of type t obtains the 
second good only at a price of 1 - (jc). Now, the expected payoff of the bidder of 
type t is : 
•U 
+ {"[Vi W + (0 - bn (s) - V, (5)] - u[v, (0 - bjj is)}h{s)ds 
+ | _ � , ) " [ V 2 W - ( 1 - � 论 . （4.17) 
It is obvious to see that the expected payoff function (4.17) in this case is 
identical to equation (4.1). Since the expected payoff functions are same, the solutions 
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In this paper, I study a budget-constrained, private-valuation, sequential auction 
with two incompletely-informed risk-averse bidders. I investigate the equilibrium 
bidding functions and expected revenue with respect to the first and second price 
formation rules. 
I show that the sequence of sale affects the expected revenue. In particular, the 
expected revenue is higher if the more valuable good is sold first. Thus, I successfully 
carry over the observation noted by Benoit and Krishna (2001) and Pitchik (2004) to 
the case of risk aversion. 
Also, I study the equilibrium bidding functions under the first price and second 
price auctions. I first consider the special case where the two goods are allocated to 
different bidders separately. I show that the bidding price of good one is higher under 
the second price rule. Again, this shows that Pitchik's observation remains valid even 
bidders are risk-averse. 
Then I consider a general case in which there is a possibility of wining both 
goods by one single bidder. I show that, under the second price auction, the 
equilibrium bidding function of the first good is identical to that of the special case 
where the goods are allocated to different bidders separately. In addition, I show that 
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the “identical solution，，result cannot carry over to the first price auction. 
The last but not the least, I relax the setting that the winning bid of the first stage 
is announced. I show that even if it is concealed, the equilibrium bidding function 
under second price rule will not change. Thus, the bidding behavior of the bidder is 
not affected if the winning bid is concealed under the second price auction. 
I admit that the results obtained in this paper may not valid in a more 
complicated extent, such as two heterogeneous goods allocating to three bidders. If 
one more bidder is added to the above problem, the loser of the first stage auction 
would not sure be the winner of the second good, even if assumption A6 is made. 
Therefore, the expected payoff function of the bidder would be substantially 
complicated. 
Also, for the case of three goods competing by two bidders, the problems would 
also be complicated in a sizable extent. Since the winner of the first good has to 
decide how to utilize his remaining income in the coming two auctions, the results 
obtained also may not valid anymore. 
Some further studies can be investigated beyond this paper. In this paper, for 
simplicity, I have assumed that the incomes of the both bidders are also one. If this 
assumption is relaxed, the probability of winning both good by single bidder is greatly 
affected. Following Pitchik (2004), I assume that there are two bidders competing for 
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two heterogeneous goods. If one more good is introduced to the sequential auction, i.e. 
two bidders compete for three goods; then the bidding behavior of the bidders will be 
substantially complicated. In the section of more general cases, I skip the case of 
wining nothing upon pretending. If this possibility is reintroduced, the "identical 
derivative" result may not valid anymore. 
The auction problem investigated in the thesis can be applied to practical market. 
For example, if the firms with limited financial capacities bid on projects let by 
government, the results of the auctions will heavily depend on the available capacity 
of firms in the industry. 
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